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Abstract: Based on the angle of institution, this paper takes internal institutions 
and external institutions as the analysis framework. When study the case of the street 
lamps supply in Majia Village, the paper finds internal institutions will have an important 
impact on the multi-protagonists supply mode option of rural public goods. As a result, 
external institutions has certain mandatory, but if lack of internal institutions support, it 
can’t be put in practice effectively. On this basis, the paper, at the level of regional 
economic development, further analyzes the desirability that current multi-protagonists 
supply public goods. It presents a concept that is ‘dual quasi-public goods’. With 
reference to multi-dimensional trigger, centrobaric trigger and coordinated trigger, the 
paper conducts a discussion about the trigger mode of the multi-protagonists supply of 
the public goods. 
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Reference to the development experience of the developed countries which have finished 
economic transformation (Timmer,1998), China should gradually enhance the investment 
in rural public goods. The character of public goods decides that the subject of 
investment is government, but actually, because of the reform of administrative system 
and financial system, local government has more routine power than financial power in 
china (Shi, 2005), therefore, financial shortage will occur if rural public goods are only 
supplied by local government. Under this circumstance, to enlarge the rural public supply, 
the only supply mode is mutual supply by government and villagers (Kuang and Wang, 
2004). There is an important question induced by this---public goods should be supplied 
by government, now villagers provide part of them---will they accept this kind of 
multi-protagonists supply mode? In other words, this supply mode of rural public goods 
maybe face the acceptance and tension of the informal rule, such as habit, custom et al. 
Based on this, in this paper, we study the case of the street lamps supply in Majia Village, 
take internal institutions and external  
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 institutions as the analysis framework(Kasper and Streit,2000), discuss the institution 
restriction rural public goods multi-protagonists and provide the enlightenment from  
the level of institution to enhance the rural public goods supply during the economic 
transformation. 
 
I. “Light the street”---the street lamp project in Majia Village 
1. The arrangement of external institution 
Approved by the State Council, L district was set up in June, 1997, locats in the 
east-north of A city, and includes 4 towns, 1 township, 1 avenue, with 380 square 
kilometers and 168k population. As the economic developed fast after setting up, the 
average annual increase of GDP and financial revenue are 20.2% and 35.2%, respectively. 
Due to the subjective and historical reason, the economic base is still weak. In 2002, the 
GDP and financial percentage of the whole city are 1.6% and 1.5%, respectively. The 
percentage of urbanization is only 17.6%, which is 24.7% lower than the average level of 
A City and public service severely lags. 
In 2003, after study, the district government began to implement “Light the 
Street”---the street lamp project in rural country. Because of the financial limitation, they 
made the final decision as below: the cost of installation is taken 1/3 by district 
government, town government and villager, respectively. After that, the electric charge 
will be undertaken by villager averagely. This is officially informed to all town and 
township government in the form of administrative letter. 
C town is one of four towns in L district, with 14k population. The average annual 
net incoming per capita were over 5K RMB, which got the standard of well-off town. In 
2003, the revenue and expenditure are 29190K RMB and 28800K RMB respectively, 
therefore the balance was only 39K RMB. Consequently, “Light the Street”---the street 
lamp project in rural country advocated by the district government faces the financial 
shortage. Under the pressure of performance evaluation from upper government, the C 
town government decided to take the 1/3 cost of installation and transmitted this to lower 
village committee. 
The village committee is an autonomous organization by law, but based on the 
investigation of Liu (2006), it is considered as the level-I organ of political power or the 
designated organization of town government. It is very common that the village 
committee does administrative work or disposes the autonomous items instead of villager. 
Therefore, in this paper, village committee has dual role as government organization and 
autonomous organization, and the former is more. Majia village located in the center of C 
town with 3000 population and is the first place to implement the street lamp project in 
rural country. The annual revenue is about 600K; according to the balance principle of 
revenue and expenditure, the monthly expenditure should be 50K. The remainder is 
almost zero after deducting the water conservancy facilities maintenance, welfare for the 
old person, administrative subsidies to village committee, militia construction et al. To 
 implement the project from upper government and show demonstrative effect, at the end 
of 2004, after investigating on the spot, the new village committee decided to install 200 
street lamps on the main street. The 10K RMB cost of installation will be undertaken by 
village committee. After calculation, about 3000 RMB monthly electric charge will be 
undertaken by villagers. 
2. The villagers’ reaction and the partial adjustment of external institution 
After 200 street lamps installation, Majia Village’s night was never dark and it is 
convenient for villager to walk at night. The social security is much better than before 
because of the installation of street lamps (such as less burglary). But after two months’ 
usage, when village committee asked for the electric charge for the first time, the 
villagers refused to pay the averaged electric charge for all kinds of excuse, such as 
nobody at home all the year, far away from the street lamp, lower incoming et al. 
Because the electrical charge can’t be solved, the street lamps were shut down. 
During the following one year when the street lamps were idled, the village 
committee tried to solve the electric charge issue by so many methods. After denying the 
transfer cost from the upper government and financial support from village committee, 
they did adjust the external institution. The rural inhabitation habit is that a couple of 
family lived together as a group. So that, the 200 street lamps were divided to some 
groups and were installed electric meters to share the electric charge and manage the 
street lamps by group. According to the principle of “pay it, get it”, the village committee 
will shut down the electric power to the group who refused to pay for the electric charge. 
After some of villagers accepted this supply mode, the night of Majia Village was 
partially light again. 
3. Consideration of the internal institution 
Obviously, the government goal of the project wasn’t reached in Majia Village. The 
prisoner’s dilemma of public goods was adopted to explain it by the traditional analytical 
method, thus the failure of the street lamp supply is the consequent result of the game 
action of villager for the rural public goods. But actually, behind the action, what is 
hidden more deeply is possibly the internal institution related to habit and custom which 
form from the long-term supply of public goods. Since the villagers communicated each 
other in the same village because of the kinship or relationship, the common habit and 
custom for public goods are finally formed, which will form the stable internal institution, 
and eventually affect the villagers’ preference for the public good supply mode. The 
villager committee changed part of the external institution after the project was 
suspended by the initial external institution. As suggested above, the essence of that 
external institutional change of the village committee is the reaction and adjustment of 
internal institution constrains. 
Now, to discuss the failure of street lamp supply in Majia Village, quantitative 
analysis is taken from the angle of the relationship between internal institution and 
external institution which is usually ignored or less investigated. 
 
 II. Quantitative analysis of institution influence 
We did questionnaire survey about street lamp supply in Majia Village in 2006 summer. 
The respondents are the persons aged older than 18 and younger than 60. Total 400 
questionnaires were sent out, and 356 ones were valid. We still interviewed with some of 
villagers. 
1.Hypothesis 
To do empirical analysis of the influence of external institution and internal 
institution on the rural public goods supply, based on the above analysis, we do some 
assumptions as following: 1) The judgment on whether the electric charge method is 
reasonable or not represents whether the villagers agreed themselves as the 
multi-protagonists of the street lamp supply. That means, if they agree the street lamp 
charge method, they will accept the multi-protagonists supply mode of rural public goods, 
and vice versa. 2) Villager’s reasonable judgment on it is not only affected by external 
institution but also restricted by internal institution. 
2.Variable design 
According to above assumptions, we designed a dependent variable and several 
independent variables which reflect the characters of internal and external institution in the 
questionnaire. The internal institution includes habit, internal rule, custom, formal internal 
rule as shown in Table 1. All indicators are qualitative except annual income and education 
level.  
Dependent variable of “Is it reasonable for government to charge street lamp?” is a 
virtual bi-variable. “1” is set for “reasonable”; “0” is set for “unreasonable’. For detail, 
refer table 1. If one village chooses “1’, it means that he agrees to charge the street lamp by 
himself, and vice versa. 
The institutional factors which affect the dependent variable include the internal 
institution and external institution. Habit, one of the four factors of internal institution, 
shows the character of obvious and direct advantage to personal and of damage on 
personal self-interest after violating such rules. It is reflected by 5 indicators including 
gender, personal annual income, career, education level and “Do your family or you go to 
work early and come back late?” According to common sense, the female normally feel 
more unsafe than the male, thus we deduce that the female will give more support on the 
street lamp supply. In the survey, we found that some rich villagers donated the electric 
charge, therefore we can get the conclusion that the personal income level can affect the 
usage habit of street lamp. Personal career, such as farmer or non-farmer, maybe influence 
the living habit, consequently affects the option of street lamp supply mode. Zhang and He 
(1996) thought that villagers with high education level realized the long-term benefit from 
the public goods supply, so they will increase the requirement of the public goods. From 
this, education level will affect the usage habit also. Generally, villagers whose family or 
who go to work early and come back late have more understanding of security. The street 
lamp supply is good for them to go out, and will affect their habit correspondingly. 
 Table 1           Variable Definition in Regression Analysis 
 Indicator Unit Definition 
Dependent 
Variable 
Is it reasonable for government to 
charge street lamp? 
Virtual 
Variable 
1 for reasonable 
0 for unreasonable 
Habit gender Virtual 
Variable 
1 for male 
0 for female 
 In (personal annual income) RMB Logarithm of personal annual 
income 
 Career Virtual 
Variable 
1 for farmer 
0 for others 
 Education Level Year 6 for primary or below 
9 for junior middle school 
12 for senior middle school or 
technical secondary school 
15 for college or above 
 Do your family or you go to work 
early and come back late? 
Virtual 
Variable 
1 for yes or no 
0 for occasionally 
Internal Rule Will you feel guilty when you don’t 
pay the electric charge? 
Virtual 
Variable 
1 for yes 
0 for no 
Custom Will you be accused when you don’t 
pay the electric charge? 
Virtual 
Variable 
1 for yes 
0 for no 
Formal 
Internal Rule 
Is it necessary to set up special 
committee to manage street lamp? 
Virtual 
Variable 
1 for yes 
0 for no 
 Can village committee persuade 
villagers to pay the electric charge? 
Virtual 
Variable 
1 for yes 
0 for no 
External 
Institution 
Whose interest does the village 
committee represent? 
Virtual 
Variable 
1 for government or villager 
interest 
0 for government and villager 
interest 
 Government motivation to install 
street lamp 
Virtual 
Variable 
1 for government performance 
0 for non-government 
performance 
 
The above factors reflect the influence of the habit whether the villagers agree with the 
charge of street lamp. 
Normally, internal rule is the rule obeyed spontaneously by the persons in 
community who feel guilty when they violated it, thus we represent it by “Will you feel 
guilty when you don’t pay the electric charge? ”.Custom is represented by “Will you be 
accused when you don’t pay the electric charge?”, because the others in the community 
will informally monitor the status how these rules are obeyed, once someone violates this 
institution,  he will find himself excluded by the others of this community. Therefore, 
 we conclude that if someone in the community will be accused when he doesn’t pay the 
electric charge, then the related custom is formed in this community. 
The third party plays the role and executes the formal internal rule in the community. 
The indicator “Is it necessary to set up special committee to manage street lamp?” 
represents whether it is necessary to interfere the street lamp project from the formal 
internal rule via the third party. Meantime, because of the special dual roles of village 
committee and from the angle of autonomous organization of villager, we consider the 
village committee as the third part to observe “Can village committee persuade villagers 
to pay the electric charge?”. 
To observe how the external institution has the effect on whether the villagers agree 
to pay the street lamp charge, we use two indicators to show it: “Whose interest does the 
village committee represent?” and “Government motivation of installation street lamp”. 
The first indicator reflects the interest of village committee, whose dual-role identity 
maybe make its interest have effect on the villager’s agreement with the street lamp 
charge. The second indicator reflects the government motivation of street lamp 
installation, which maybe have direct impact on street lamp charge by villager. 
3.Quantitative analysis 
Probit model was chosen because the dependent variables are visual ones. The 
analysis result was shown in Table 2 via S/W Eviews 3.1 and related calculation. The 
explanation ability of this model is 22.8%, and the predictive accuracy is 76.87%. Over all, 
the result of this model is excellent. From table 2, the findings are as below: 
3.1 From the view of habit, one factor of internal institution, 3 indicators out of 5, 
Gender, personal annual income and career show the statistical significance. The male 
disagree more with the government charge activity, which marginal probability is -13.3%, 
but the female show more tendency of agreement with it. Therefore, in the street lamp 
supply, gender, an indicator reflects the formation of habit, has significant impact on the 
activity of street lamp charge. In the view of career, marginal probability is 16.8% for the 
villager who works as a farmer and thinks this kind of charge is reasonable, thus that 
shows the more the villager works in the village, the more he need the street lamp. It is also 
shown in the research by Luo (2007) that local public goods investment has less income 
effect to the villagers who work outside, thus they don’t want to invest in public goods in 
village. It coincides with the conclusion in this paper. From the table 2, we also conclude 
that personal annual income affects the villager’s attitude to the street lamp charge. The 
probability of reasonable charge will have a rise of 33.7% with the increase by one unit of 
logarithm of income. Actually, we learned that the electric charge of some groups was 
donated by some villager with high income. 
That education level doesn’t have statistical relation with the attitude to the street lamp 
charge demonstrates education level has no effect on the mode of street lamp charge. 
That maybe because the current education level of them isn’t high, therefore the villagers 
haven’t realized the long-term interest of public goods. 51.7% of participants are with 
education level of junior middle school or below, and 96.6% of them are with senior  
 Table 2      Determinants of whether it is reasonable of electric charge by government  
(Probit Regression Analysis) 
Variable Description Regression 
Coefficients 
Significant  
Level 
Marginal 
Probability 
Habit Male -0.514 0.049 -0.133 
 Personal Annual Income 1.060 0.003 0.337 
 Career as Farmer 0.467 0.107 0.168 
 Education Level 0.010 0.857 0.003 
 Work out early and come back late 0.380 0.258 0.134 
 Don’t work out early and come back 
late 
-0.282 0.427 -0.081 
Internal 
Rule 
Guilty for not undertake the electric 
charge 
1.406 0.004 0.518 
Custom To be accused for not undertake the 
electric charge 
-0.364 0.391 -0.101 
Formal 
Internal 
Rule 
Set up special committee to manger 
street lamp in the village 
-0.459 0.100 -0.122 
 Village committee can persuade 
village to pay the electric charge 
0.095 0.764 0.359 
External 
Institution 
Village committee represents the 
interest of government 
-0.303 0.472 -0.086 
 Village committee represents the 
interest of villagers 
0.714 0.044 0.266 
 Government installs the street lamp 
due to its performance 
-0.313 0.211 -0.088 
Constant -10.276 0.002 -0.518 
R-squared 0.228 Predictive Accuracy 76.87* 
Sample 
Number 
148 villagers out of 356 think it is reasonable of the electric charge by government 
*the ratio of the number of samples with above 50% accuracy to the number of the whole samples 
 
middle school or below.  It is no statistical meaning of the indicator “Do your family or 
you work out early and come back late”, thus they don’t have clear effect on the charge 
mode. From common sense, villagers who work out early and come back late should 
need street lamp supply much more than the ones don’t do so. It is understandable that 
the villagers have less sensitivity of street lamp supply because of the habit of villagers 
who work at day and sleep at night in rural country. 
3.2 The internal rule, one of the internal institutions, has notable meaning to whether 
the villager pays the electric charge or not. It is shown in the table that the villager who feel 
guilty if he doesn’t pay the electric charge, compared with the villager who don’t feel 
 guilty if he doesn’t pay the electric charge, whose marginal probability of agreement with 
electric charge is 51%. It means that the internal rule has strong positive effect on personal 
activity. 
3.3 The indicator of custom, “Will you be accused when you don’t pay the electric 
charge?”, has no statistical meaning. Only when the quantity of persons who accept the 
rule reaches the critical point in the community, the rule will be changed to custom. That 
means only when the electric charge should be undertaken by villagers, meantime, if 
someone who doesn’t undertake it will be accused by the others. From this, the custom that 
most of the villagers agree with the electric charge hasn’t been generated. 
3.4 From the view of formal internal rule, one of the internal institutions, “Is it 
necessary to set up special committee to manage street lamp?” is with statistical meaning. 
The marginal probability of the public goods supply by villagers who think it is necessary 
to set up special committee to manager street lamp is 12.2%. From this, to set up special 
committee to manage street lamp has negative effect on street lamp charge. Essentially, the 
villagers don’t agree with street lamp charge. That the indicator “Can village committee 
persuade villagers to pay the electric charge?” isn’t with statistical meaning shows the 
village committee as the third party can’t persuade the villager to undertake the electric 
charge. 
3.5 The indicator “Whose interest does the village committee represent?”, one factor 
of the external institutions, shows the statistical meaning. 26.6% is the marginal 
probability of agreement with street lamp charge by villagers who think village committee 
represents the interest of villagers. If villagers think the village committee represents the 
interest of themselves, they will support the committee and prefer undertaking the electric 
charge. The other two indicators, “village committee represents the interest of 
government” and “Whether the motivation of installation street lamp relates to the 
government performance?”, don’t show statistical meaning. According to above analysis, 
the mind of villager to undertake the street lamp charge is not sensitive to external 
institution, but is affected more by internal institution. 
4. Summary 
4.1Internal institution plays a key role in the villagers’ option of multi-protagonists 
supply mode of street lamp. Based on above quantitative analysis, some indicators of 
internal institution have remarkable effect on the street lamp supply mode, which include 
habit indicators of gender, personal annual income and career, internal rule indicator of 
“Will you feel guilty when you don’t pay the electric charge?”, formal internal rule 
indicator of “Is it necessary to set up special committee to manage street lamp?”. 
4.2The external institution has weak effect on the villager’s decision of street lamp 
supply mode. The villager only think about the self-interest when making the decision of 
street lamp charge, thus the internal institution has much more remarkable effect than the 
external institution. 
4.3The external institution arrangement that the villager is one of the subjects of street 
lamp supply lacks the support and coordination from the internal institution. That shows as 
 below: in terms of custom, the villagers haven’t generated the custom of support the street 
lamp charge in the community; in the term of habit, the indicators such as villager’s 
education level et al hasn’t formed the effective support to the street lamp charge in the 
rural; in the term of formal internal rule, there is lack of support from the third part who can 
affect the street lamp charge. Hence, in Majia Village, the street lamp project which is only 
mandatorily driven by the external institution is difficult to implement without the 
foundation and coordination of internal institution. 
 
III. Mode Analysis of multi-protagonists public goods supply 
1. Inevitability of multi-protagonists supply mode chosen by government 
1.1 Government faces the external pressure to pursue the public interest. In the 
research of Munnel (1990) and Fan et.al. (2002), the public goods investment promotes the 
agricultural production largely. In the research of Calderon and Serven (2004), the income 
gap between in urban and in rural will be reduced by increasing the quantity and quality of 
such public goods as infrastructure in backward area. In China, a typical dual economic 
society, from the aspects of public goods supply, the infrastructure in urban and in rural 
exist at the same time, so that, enhancing the investment in rural public goods promotes the 
economic development in rural area. Dual economic problem is clear because only 17.6% 
is the urbanization of L district in Majia Village. As a new district, the rural infrastructure 
improvement is the main task faced by government of L district. Under the pressure of 
regional economic development, it is an inevitable option for government of L district to 
implement the street lamp project in rural. 
1.2 Government has the internal motivation to maximize self-interest. Firstly, in 
china, the designation of officer is from upper government, thus the indicator to evaluate 
the officer is government performance. To obtain it and to consider self-interest, the 
down-level government will lead the large street lamp project, even though with the 
financial limitation. Secondly, the hierarchical and regional character of public goods 
affects the expenditure from different level government and decides the routine power of 
relative government. According to public economic theory, government pursues the 
maximal budget with the impulse of internal continuous expansion. Therefore, the local 
government shows the tendency to enlarge local routine power to acquire more financial 
power. Even though with financial limitation, the local government still implement the 
project of street lamp in rural, therefore, they can get the chip from upper government in 
the next round. 
Based on above dual interest, even though with the financial limitation, the district 
government still mandatorily implement the project of street lamp in rural via 
administrative order, hence, they can achieve the expected interest target by this kind of 
arrangement of “up-to-down” system.  
2. Institutional conflict induced by mandatory supply of multi-protagonists public 
goods 
 As for pure public goods, government, the main subject of supply, should make 
administrative arrangement. Once the public goods take the multi-protagonists supply 
mode, they will be the quasi public goods. As it, government can take cooperation such as 
PPP to implement it. Meantime, if government mandatorily arranges other subjects from 
“up-to- ，down” it will violate the character of quasi public goods and be conflicted by 
other subjects from the aspect of internal institution consequently. 
Multi-protagonists supply mode was used in the street lamp project in Majia Village, 
hence street lamp is viewed as quasi public goods. Two phases in its supply: phase I, street 
lamp installation and phase II, electric charge. In phase I, 1/3 installation fee was 
undertaken by district government, town government and villagers respectively. The 
related part taken by villagers was charged from village financial resource based on the 
discussion of village committee who represents the dual-role of government and villager, 
hence, the wishes of villager were not effectively shown in this phase. It was imagined that 
if the 1/3 installation fee was undertaken by villagers, the internal institutional conflict of 
the street lamp project maybe strongly shown in phase I. After entering Phase II, villagers 
had to undertake the electric charge by themselves, so that their wishes were fully shown 
that they don’t undertake the electric charge to conflict the mandatory arrangement of 
external institution by government. 
Street lamp should be a kind of public goods in essence, which was supplied as 
quasi public goods in this case. This kind of quasi public goods isn’t the quasi public 
goods from the angle of economics meaning, but is the “quasi public goods” with strong 
support from government to promote the regional economic development and reduce the 
dual economic gap during economic transformation. In this case, the government didn’t 
deeply understand the character and background of “dual quasi public goods” and only 
followed the simple path-dependent character to mandatorily implement the project, 
eventually it is impossible to reached desired effect. 
3. Trigger mode of dual quasi public goods supply 
In the circumstance of dual economics, to enhance the economic development, it is 
an available option that public goods such as street lamp are supplied by 
multi-protagonists as the quasi public goods currently. By the feature of quasi public 
goods, dual quasi public goods should be implemented in collaboration but not 
mandatorily. We simply elaborate how to implement it in collaboration by a 
multi-strategy game. The subjects of game are government and private. Three strategies 
can be chosen: supply by government, private or multi-protagonists. Nash Equilibrium 
strategies in this game are (government, government) and (private, private), whose 
benefits are assumed (3,3) and (1,1), respectively. Because multi-protagonists can raise 
more fund, benefit of the it is much higher, supposed to (4,4), but it is not the Nash 
Equilibrium of this game. How to solve the prisoner’s dilemma in public goods supply, 
game theory provide a “trigger strategy” mechanism, i.e., both sides tentatively cooperate 
firstly. Once they find the other side betray it, they won’t do so to revenge. Trigger 
strategy is thought as the key mechanism to realize cooperattion and to increase 
 equilibrium efficiency in repeated games. In the dual quasi public goods supply, at first, 
government and private may tentatively adopt the strategy of multi-protagonists supply 
to achieve the better result to both sides, and acquire path arrangement of subgame 
perfect Nash Equilibrium in repeated games. The institutional optimum mode, by which 
to implement “dual quasi public goods” supply with “trigger strategy” idea, is called 
“trigger mode”, which can be realized via the following three different institutional 
triggers. 
3.1 Multi-dimensional trigger of external institution. External institution, clearly 
formulated in statutes and laws, was rule which was officially executed by an authorized 
organization in upper society such as government. “Dual quasi public goods” requires 
government taking the cooperative supply method between public and private, therefore, 
government external institutional arrangement must change the administrative character 
of authority and compulsion instead of the tendency of tentative cooperation. Through 
multi-dimensional communication channels such as direct communication, indirect 
communication, the third-party communication et al, government public the benefits 
compared among government supply, private supply and multi-protagonists supply, 
introduce the character of multi-protagonists supply, let private more understand the 
sincere cooperation and future vision from government, and effectively trigger the 
strategic choice of multi-protagonists supply. In the case of street lamp in Majia Village, 
government wasn’t aware of the importance of tentative cooperation, but rather simply 
adopted mandatory arrangement, hence, they can’t achieve highly efficient result of 
multi-protagonists supply. 
3.2 Centrobaric trigger of internal institution. Internal institution is a kind of rule 
developed from an evolution progress with gradual feedback and adjustment and is a 
kind of potential rule in the human heart which enforces the behavior constrains to actor 
in the social interaction from the inside of a group. The internal institutional character of 
gradual evolution determines that it is impossible for private to accept the public goods 
multi-protagonists supply mode fast and fully, therefore, government can guide and focus 
on the internal institution to enforce the key population’s trigger. As statistical analysis 
shown of this case, personal annual income notably affects the villager’s attitude to street 
lamp charge, thus, government can focus on triggering the richer villagers and 
emphasizing their acceptance of habit of internal institution. Meantime, government 
negotiates with the richer villager to undertake more electric charge to reduce the burden 
from poorer villager, or subsidizes or deducts some electric charge to poorer villager. 
Consequently, more villagers will support this project. Eventually, that leads to the 
trigger and evolution of internal institution. It is also shown from the statistics analysis 
that the marginal probability is more than 51% to the villagers who agree with electric 
charge and feel guilty if they don’t undertake it. Government also can enforce centobaric 
trigger to these villagers to make internal rule work. 
3.3 Coordinated trigger between internal and external institution. A social institution 
is based on the internal institution of gradual evolution which can’t prevent the 
 opportunism tendency, hence, external institution is required to guard it. During the 
dynamic process of multi-protagonists supply of public goods, the coordinated effects of 
internal and external institution should be aware of. The internal institutional changes 
generated from external institution, increase the benefits to part of villagers, and 
consequently enhance the internal institution’s trust to external institution by spreading 
widely via the channel of information. Economic and social effects related to the positive 
adjustment and response of external institution which are generated from the requirement 
of internal institution, are shown via a certain way to promote external institution to 
accept internal institution. By the coordinated trigger between internal and external 
institution, the multi-protagonists supply to the “dual quasi public goods” will be better 
and last more. 
 
IV Conclusion and Enlightenment 
The case study of the rural public goods supply shows that the internal institution has 
great effect on the choice of mode of rural public goods multi-protagonists supply, 
therefore, although external institution is mandatory in some degree, it is difficult to 
enforce supply only by external institution with the cooperation with internal institution. 
The internal institution has remarkable effect on the supply mode of rural public goods in 
the traditional village with the relationship of geography and kinship. 
In this paper, it is advisable to take multi-protagonists supply of rural public goods 
during the regional economic development currently. Based on this, trigger mode of 
multi-protagonists supply of rural public goods is discussed. It shows that government 
should not arrange it mandatorily, but promote it cooperatively when supplying the “dual 
quasi public goods”. First, government should give a clear signal of sincerely 
cooperation via multi-dimensional trigger, to enhance the acceptance of external 
institution by private. Second, after dividing the type of private subject, government 
guide the key population, drive the non-key ones and trigger the wide acceptance of 
internal institution of multi-protagonist supply mode by private subject. Last, 
government should promote the coordinated trigger between internal and external 
institution. By the trust between internal and external institution and with the help of 
internal institution, government adjusts, corrects, and perfects the external institution to 
make it more reflect the common people’s interest. Taking the advance of external 
institution, developing, optimizing and promoting internal institution, internal institution 
more adapting the requirement of economic social development, will be beneficial to the 
effective supply of rural public goods and promote public goods entering the Chinese 
villages faster and better. 
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